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The We and its Many Forms: Kurt Stavenhagen’s Contribution to Social Phenomenology. 






“We” is said in many ways. This paper investigates Kurt Stavenhagen’s neglected account of different kinds 
of “we,” which is maintained to be one of the most sophisticated within classical phenomenology. The paper 
starts by elaborating on the phenomenological distinction between mass, society and community by claiming 
that individuals partake in episodes of experiential sharing only within communities. Stavenhagen 
conceptualises experiential sharing as a meshing of conscious experiences infused by a feeling of us-ness. The 
remainder of the paper focuses on Stavenhagen’s distinction of various senses of us: when individual share 
preferences, have mutual respect, or emotionally evaluate the world according to a cultural tradition, they elicit 
a sense of us of different kind and, thus, form communities of different kind. Within phenomenology, 
Stavenhagen should be credited with the merit of having unearthed the aggregative, we-generating force of 
preferences, of respect, and of (certain) emotions. 
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0. Introduction 
 
An important line of research has recently started to uncover the vast body of insights secured by classical 
phenomenology on the fundaments of human sociality, which is a topic that is currently occupying important 
debates in philosophy of mind and social ontology (see Bratman 2014, Gilbert 2014, List & Pettit 2011, Searle 
2010, Tomasello 2014). By now, this line of research has established that members of the so-called Munich 
and Göttingen Circles of Phenomenology have extensively discussed issues including experiential sharing, the 
metaphysics of social and institutional facts, the relation between experiential sharing and social cognition 
(Salice 2015, Salice & Schmid 2016, Szanto & Moran 2016). Works by Husserl (Szanto 2016, Zahavi 2019), 
Reinach (Salice & Uemura 2018), Scheler (Salice 2016, Schloßberger 2016), Stein (Vendrell Ferran 2015, 
Szanto 2015, Gombocz & Salice 2006), von Hildebrand (Salice 2016, León 2019), Walther (León & Zahavi 
2016, Zahavi & Salice 2016), among others, have been (and still are) subject to an in-depth interpretation, 
which not only considers them from a historical perspective, but also aims at showing their relevance to 
systematic questions. 
 
This paper intends to contribute to this line of investigation by presenting the work of a phenomenologist that 
so far has been left at the periphery of this excavating work: Kurt Stavenhagen. Although his name has gone 
almost completely unnoticed in this strand of research, Stavenhagen devoted to social phenomenology the vast 
majority of his publications and, especially, three monograph studies (The Essence of the Nation of 1934, 
Critical Developments in Folk Theory of 1936, and Homeland as Meaning of Life of 1948 [1939]) and a long 
series of articles (of which two are particularly significant to the purposes of this paper: Respect as Feeling of 
Solidarity and Foundation of Communities of 1931 and Charismatic Unities of Personalities, 1933).1 
Arguably, only very few other phenomenologists have published as extensively as Stavenhagen on the grounds 
of human sociality, which makes current research’s inattention to his contributions an even more unfortunate 
gap. The present article aims at filling this research desideratum by offering the first comprehensive view of 
Stavenhagen’s social phenomenology in the literature. It is claimed not only that his description of experiential 
sharing reaches an unprecedented level of sophistication within phenomenology, but also that his account of 
the various mechanisms, which regulate the emergence of communities, significantly advances the 
phenomenological understanding of sociality.  
 
It has been suggested, not implausibly, that Stavenhagen’s long-standing interest in social phenomenology is 
nourished by the vicissitudes of his personal life (Spiegelberg 1965: 220). As he belonged to the German 
speaking minority in the Baltic countries, it might not come as a surprise that large parts of his philosophical 
reflection are concerned with issues related to social identity and group memberships (see Stavenhagen 1957: 
308, Spiegelberg 1965, Rozenvalds 2000, Tilitzki 2002: 805f). It also merits attention that, during the Nazi 
occupation of the Baltic countries, Stavenhagen took up the important chairs for philosophy in Königsberg 
(1939-1941) and Poznań (1941-1945). These facts could invite the conjecture of Stavenhagen’s allegiance to 
Nazi ideology. This inference should be resisted, however. 
 
Stavenhagen, who actively engaged in the political debate surrounding the question of German speaking 
minorities in the twenties and thirties, was not a member of the Nazi party, his political views were not aligned 
with – indeed opposed to – Nazism (see Stavenhagen 1932), and he was looked at by the party with profound 
“uneasiness [Unbehagen]” (Tilitzki 2002: 806, see also 789ff). Even more relevant to the purposes of this 
paper is the fact that the content of the above mentioned publications clearly reveals that Stavenhagen’s 
understanding of the synonymous concepts of cultural nation or people (Kulturnation and Volk, 1934: 93) is 
far remote from the Blut und Boden characterisation promoted by Nazi ideologues in that turn of years, which 
 
1 All translations from Stavenhagen are mine. Stavenhagen’s other important contributions are an investigation 
into the phenomenology of religious attitudes (1925), a Kant’s biography (1949), and the posthumously 
published Person and Personality (1957), which is mainly concerned with philosophical anthropology.   
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he bluntly dismisses as nothing else than “pre-scientific magic” (1934: 65; 1934: 8). As this article will clarify, 
Stavenhagen considers the concepts of nation or people to point to a particular kind of communities: these are 
communities, which are founded in language, tradition, and in the self-representation the group has of itself (a 
“we-idea [Wir-Idee]”), but not in geographic—and certainly not in biological—features. 
 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 1 introduces Stavenhagen’s position against the backdrop of the 
phenomenological distinction between mass, society, and community. Section 2 explores three main forms of 
communities: cohesive communities, communities of respect, and cultural nations or people.2 In the 
conclusion, I sketch some lines of investigations for future research on Stavenhagen’s social phenomenology. 
 
1. Mass, Society, and Community 
 
In a recent paper, Amie Thomasson claims that, since the notion of a group is variegated and multifarious, 
philosophers should be more concerned with the pragmatic use ordinary language speakers make of that notion 
rather than aiming at a real definition of it (Thomasson 2016). Early phenomenologists would agree with the 
premise of Thomasson’s reasoning, but would reject its consequence. They would rather argue that 
Thomasson’s premise delivers the reason why one must put efforts into distinguishing various kinds of groups 
by identifying their distinctive features.  
 
It is important not to misunderstand the task phenomenologists set for themselves, though. On the one hand, 
they worked towards a taxonomy of fundamental kinds of social groups (Scheler 1973: 519ff). Yet, on the 
other hand, they were aware that actually existing groups do not neatly fall under the kinds at the basis of this 
taxonomy, for they usually have mixed natures (Stavenhagen 1934: 27): they exemplify different kinds at the 
same time. For instance, families are constituted by a mixture of societal as well as communal features 
(community and society being two distinct kinds of groups, as discussed below). However, phenomenologists 
also contended that actually existing groups do tend to exemplify a single kind more typically than others (a 
certain family, e.g., could have features that are predominantly societal or communal). If that is correct, then 
sociological descriptions of actually existing groups presuppose a preliminary understanding of basic kind of 
groups (in terms of which actual groups are described). This, in the phenomenologist’s eyes, justifies the task 
of developing a sound taxonomy of those kinds.  
 
The starting point of this taxonomy is the distinction between societies and communities, which has been 
originally laid out by Ferdinand Tönnies in his work Community and Society (1887). While all 
phenomenologists ultimately endorse that distinction (Scheler 1973, Stavenhagen 1934, Stein 1922, von 
Hildebrand 1930, Walther 1923), they importantly refine it in two different ways. First, they complement it 
with an investigation into the social attitudes that members typically adopt towards each other in the two 
groups. More precisely, they contend that different kinds of groups correlate with different kinds of social 
attitudes adopted by their members. Second, they introduce a third kind of group that remained unnoticed in 




2 This is my terminology. Stavenhagen calls cohesive communities “charismatic communities” and 
communities of respect “aidesmatic.” “Charisma” is used in its old Greek meaning of “gift” and qualifies those 
communities where the individuals “offer themselves as a gift” to the others (1933: 36 fn3, this term, hence, 
is not used in its Weberian connotation referring to a character feature of some individuals, see Weber 2010). 
The adjective “aidesmatic” stems from the Greek (where the term for respect is aidōs [αἰδώς]) and so does 
“pragmatic” (pragmata [πράγματα], situation, but also action, Stavenhagen 1934: 47). It should be noted that 
Stavenhagen enjoyed a university education (and did advanced research) in classical philology in Göttingen, 
where he also established contacts with phenomenologists (see Stavenhagen 1957: 308).  
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Start with societies. What is typical about societies is that individuals become aware of the experiences of 
another individual and take these as reasons to form other (individual) experiences.3 Suppose that Sam is sad 
at her failed exam and Pam rejoices in Sam’s sadness, thereby savouring an episode of Schadenfreude. Sam 
becomes aware of Pam’s emotion and reacts with resentment. Or imagine that Pam commiserates Sam in her 
sadness and, thus, sympathises with her, whereby Sam reciprocates with gratitude. In either case, the subjects 
become aware of the other’s experiences and take them to be reasons for forming other affective attitudes: the 
individuals’ affective experiences interlock in a specific way. Something similar may happen in the conative 
dimension. Suppose Pam intends to publish a paper and comes to know that Sam has the same intention. Sam 
and Pam may take their individual intentions to be reasons for forming other intentions: to maximise their 
strategic interests, they could decide to join forces in order to reach their goal (to publish a paper). In all these 
cases, Pam and Sam form (short-lived and small-case) societies. I will elaborate on further aspects of societies 
below, but it is important to emphasise already now that, in a society, one’s experience impacts another’s 
experience in the sense that it is consciously factored in one’s emotional life or action planning. 
 
Yet, there are other ways in which one experience can “impact” somebody else’s experiential life. In the mass, 
such an impact is purely causal. For instance, imagine that, by diffusely talking with Pam about her failed 
exam and its consequences for her life, Sam’s sadness passes to Pam—here, Pam becomes sad, but does not 
have a reason for being sad. She will be typically unable to report why she feels sad and may even ignore how 
she acquired her emotion: this is a case of emotional contagion (Stavenhagen 1936: 19ff). Sometimes, 
individuals may become aware of this psychological mechanism and exploit it, e.g., to regulate their emotions. 
Sam, who is in a bad mood because she didn’t pass the exam, knows that, if she goes to Pam’s party, she will 
be infected by the crowd’s jolly atmosphere, which will help her coping with her sadness. Importantly, even 
in this last example, what characterises contagion is the fact that the agent does not have a reason for eliciting 
the emotion (and that is precisely what Sam intends to exploit). Interestingly, contagion may happen at the 
conative level, too (Stavenhagen 1936: 22, Scheler 2008: 37), where desires of an individual may pass to 
somebody else without the recipient having a reason for the desire. Think of fashion phenomena: it is often 
unclear to subjects what motivates their desire to buy a particular piece of clothing (which many in their 
environment wear) or to baptise a child with a certain name (which often recurs in a certain group at a certain 
time). Contagion is the mechanism that animates masses or crowds.  
 
Mass and society are different kinds of groups, but there is an important respect under which they are similar. 
The experience that results in the subject after her experiential life has been “impacted” by the other’s 
experience has a specific subjective property: “what-it-is-like-for-me-ness” (Zahavi & Kriegel 2015). This 
expression captures the idea that the experience feels like something to me (or is had in the I-mode, Tuomela 
2007). This is reflected in the verbal reports of the experiences, which usually employ the first personal singular 
pronoun “I.” True, in certain societies, especially those that emerge upon a strategic or “rational connection of 
interests” (rationale Interessenverbindung, Stavenhagen 1934: 32), individuals can and typically do refer to 
themselves by using the first personal plural pronoun “we”: accordingly, Pam and Sam may frame their 
intention to write the paper together as “we intend to write the paper,” where the pronoun is employed with a 
summative meaning (Stavenhagen 1933: 38). The summative meaning, according to which “we” just is “you 
and I,” should be contrasted with the collective sense of the pronoun, which points to the group (us) formed 
by you and me (see Schmid 2018 on the difference between summative and collective meanings of the first 
personal plural pronoun).  
 
 
3 There are different ways in which a subject can become aware of somebody else’s experience, but 
phenomenologists concur that the most fundamental one—from a developmental, but also conceptual 
perspective—is empathy. In empathy, the subject grasps the other experience in an intuitive or perceptual way 
(see Zahavi 2014a).  
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The collective sense of “we” is employed by members of communities and maps onto a different subjective 
property. Communal experiences, i.e., experiences shared among the members of a community, are permeated 
by a sense of us. This property could also be called “what-it-is-like-for-us-ness” (Stavenhagen speaks of our-
ness, Unserigkeit, 1933: 38): here, individuals entertain their attitudes from their first plural singular 
perspective (or in the we-mode, Tuomela 2007). The experience feels like ours to me qua community member. 
While other phenomenologists, too, subscribe to the existence of this subjective property (e.g., see Walther 
1923), Stavenhagen originally expands on this property by elaborating on four interrelated features that 
characterise communal experiences (see also Salice 2018).  
 
Suppose Pam and Sam share an emotion of sadness because their leisure trip to Japan must be cancelled due 
to some unexpected reason. Here, Pam’s and Sam’s emotions not only point to the same intentional object, but 
also evaluate it in the same way. Although necessary, these two conditions (identity of the intentional object 
and convergent evaluation of the object) are not yet sufficient to qualify the experience as shared or communal: 
certain summative scenarios may satisfy them (Walther 2013, Zahavi & Salice 2016, Searle 2002). What must 
be added to turn the summative into a collective scenario is “the demolition of a phenomenological wall” 
(Stavenhagen 1993: 39; Walther 1923: 74): Sam’s experience must impact Pam’s in such a way that, based on 
her awareness of Sam’s sadness, Pam lives through her experience as being one and the same with Sam’s, 
which is to say: the experience is lived through by Pam as ours. Thos emotion is not experienced as numerically 
distinct from Sam’s experience anymore, making us-ness an “immanent constituent of the experience” itself 
(1933: 38; 1934: 30). Call a “we-experience” an experience that has us-ness as its constituent or exemplifies 
“what-it-is-like-for-us-ness.”  
 
If Pam and Sam live through a we-experience of sadness, the way in which they intentionally relate to the 
emotions’ intentional object undergoes a substantial modification. To capture this idea, which is the second 
feature that characterizes we-experiences, Stavenhagen appeals to Husserl’s mature theory of intentionality 
(Husserl 1976) and especially to the idea that noeses (what roughly coincides with an experience’s mode 
[Searle 1983] or manner [Chalmers 2004]) are always correlated to noemata (the intentional objects insofar as 
these are experienced). According to this idea, a change in the noesis necessitates a change in the corresponding 
noema. Now, we have seen that some of a subject’s experiences can be impacted by the mental states of others 
in such a way that the subject lives through these experiences as ours. Another way of putting this is that the 
noeses of (some of) our experiences are coloured by a peculiar subjective property: us-ness. When this is the 
case, Stavenhagen claims, the corresponding noemata acquire the feature of “being familiar to us” (“sich bei 
dem gemeinsam heimisch fühlen”, 1933: 39). One way to understand this idea is that, when an object becomes 
familiar to us, our experiences unveil an aspect of the intentional object that becomes visible only insofar as, 
and to the extent that, it is intended by us. Sometimes, such “familiarity” may motivate people to keep their 
collectively valued goods in secret. Imagine a group of friends, children or teenagers, keeping those things that 
are central to their relation in secret from adults or other out-group members: a particular toy, a game, or a 
book. It could be claimed that this form of behaviour is motivated by the in-group members’ sense that only 
they can understand those items properly. Those goods, that is, are preserved from the sight of those who are 
not in a position to appreciate their true meaning.  
 
This second element has consequences for the very subject of the intentional act: if something is familiar to us 
in the sense that there is an aspect that the object reveals only to us (1933: 43ff), then it is not only to me and 
not only to you that the object is given, but precisely to us. This is the third feature that essentially characterizes 
we-experiences: their phenomenal subject is the group. Speaking of a “phenomenal subject” is not to postulate 
a group subject of the experience, however (Stavenhagen 1934: 29). It just means that the experience is lived 
through by the subject in that particular way insofar as the subject understands herself as group member. Since 
I am having an experience only to the extent in which I understand myself as a member of us, this is our 
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experience: we live through that experience together (analogously: if there is something that I own only insofar 
as you co-own it, it is ours: we own it).4  
 
Living through a we-experience entails the disposition of engaging in pro-social behaviour. This is the fourth 
feature characterising we-experiences. When Sam and Pam share an experience in the sense just described, 
they are predisposed to help and support each other (Stavenhagen 1936: 32). Importantly, the motivation for 
such behaviour derives from the we-experience itself and does not rely on other factors like moral maxims, 
concerns for one’s reputation, one’s character traits (although it is not excluded that those factors could also 
play a motivational role in communal scenarios). Solidarity—thus understood as a disposition to pro-social 
behaviour grounded in we-experiences—characterises communities and communities alone. This, again, is not 
meant to exclude that instances of help and support are present in masses and societies, but there the members 
gain the motivation to perform those actions precisely (and only) from the other factors alluded to above. 
 
At this juncture, it is important to highlight that the understanding of oneself as member of us, and thus the 
unification with the other, is itself intentional. We-experiences have double-intentionality: they consist in being 
directed to an intentional object in a particular manner and in relating to that very experience as an experience 
which is ours (see Scheler 1973: 519, Stein 2000: 137, Walther 1923: 84ff). Interestingly, the second intention 
(just as the first) can misfire. If it misfires, the subject experiences disillusion or disappointment (Stavenhagen 
1933: 46—the term is used here in Husserl’s sense to express an intentional act that is frustrated by contrasting 
evidence, Husserl 1984: 574ff): the subject has understood herself as group member, but has not unified 
because the other has not unified. Consider this case: Pam and Sam are sad because their leisure trip to Japan 
has been cancelled. Sam and Pam regret that, but Sam’s sadness is transformed according to the four features 
spelled out above, whereas Pam does not reciprocate. She thinks that the event does not demand such an 
inflated emotional response. Or she is irritated by Sam because she takes Sam’s profuse expression of sadness 
to be an indication of self-indulgence. So, whereas Sam does unify with Pam (Sam undergoes a we-
experience), Pam does not. How to describe this scenario? Stavenhagen claims that it qualifies as summative—
but in contrast to merely summative cases, it also involves something more: the unfulfilled unifying intention 
on Sam’s side (Stavenhagen 1933: 39f).  
 
Although Stavenhagen’s description of shared experiences reaches an unprecedented level of 
phenomenological complexity, its contribution so far aligns with that of other phenomenologists in considering 
the possibility of shared experiences a distinctive feature of communities. Yet, Stavenhagen takes this 
description to be the starting point of further investigations into the origin of that very self-understanding as 
group member, which is so crucial to we-experiences: what prompts a move from a self-understanding as an 
individual person to a self-understanding as a group member? In dealing with this question, Stavenhagen 
delivers his most original contribution to social phenomenology, or so I argue. By investigating this 
transformation in self-understanding, Stavenhagen comes to the conclusion that this process is contingent on 
different sets of conditions. This translates into the idea that there are different kinds of communities, which is 
 
4 Stavenhagen concurs with many authors in contemporary debate in the idea that collective attitudes require 
identification with the group and, therefore, a self-understanding as a group member (important differences in 
their accounts notwithstanding, authors like List & Pettit (2011), Pacherie (2013), Gold & Sugden (2007) 
endorse this idea). However, Stavenhagen does not offer a particularly informative description of such a self-
understanding. It appears rather uncontroversial that this self-understanding cannot be a mere belief: one can 
believe to be member of a multitude of groups without this belief having any impact on one’s emotions, 
intentions, or actions. In previous work, I have suggested that this self-understanding may be described as a 
Pushmi-Pullyu Representation (Salice & Miyazono 2019, Millikan 2004). Accordingly, to acquire a self-
understanding as group member is to acquire a representation of a hybrid kind which, at once, describes the 
subject as a group member and, concomitantly, directs her to act as such. This idea appears consistent with 
Stavenhagen’s own view, as the considerations on the ‘we-idea’ at the end of subsection 2.3 may show. 
 
 Page 7 of 16 
a point that remained almost completely unexplored by Stavenhagen’s fellow phenomenologists.5 The next 
section addresses Stavenhagen’s distinction between two kinds of communities, spiritual and pragmatic 
communities, and it expands on the three main forms of spiritual communities. 
 
2. Spiritual Communities 
 
To understand the specificity of spiritual communities, it may help to contrast them with pragmatic 
communities. Just as for spiritual communities, members of pragmatic communities can share experiences, 
which rely on their self-understanding as group members. What is peculiar of pragmatic communities is that 
such self-understanding derives from the worldly circumstances in which individuals happen to find 
themselves (which is why pragmatic communities sometimes are also called “vital communities” 
[Lebensgemeinschaften] or “communities of destiny” [Schicksalsgemeinschaften], Stavenhagen 1934: 46; 
1948: 17f).  
 
Imagine that Sam and Pam do not know each other, but destiny brings them on board of the same rescue boat, 
striving to save their lives after an accident in the cruise liner they were passengers of. The destiny of Sam is 
closely intermingled with that of Pam for one will be safe only if the other will be safe, too (Stavenhagen 1948: 
74 fn1). This example is obviously extreme because of the rigid interdependence of the destiny of the parties 
involved, but other social situations (think of military comradeships or of neighbourhoods) may be described 
in similar terms: individuals here exemplify the property of “being more or less close in a situation and, because 
of it, being reliant on mutual services” (Stavenhagen 1934: 39; philosophy of social sciences speaks of these 
situations as satisfying the “same boat condition,” where a given goal is satisfied if and only if it is satisfied 
for all group members, see Tuomela 2007: 50). Because of these circumstances, individuals unify and, by 
conceiving of themselves as group members, will share experiences with each other (which typically revolve 
around a sense of mutual responsibility, Stavenhagen 1934: 38f). 
 
In spiritual communities, the way to achieve self-understanding as group member is entirely different. What 
triggers transformation in self-understanding is primarily the fact that the individuals have certain aggregative 
attitudes: e.g., they like each other, they respect each other, or they inherit emotions from other group members. 
Of course, social situations remain the background against which those attitudes are formed, but those 
situations are not such that they psychologically compel those attitudes in the individuals. They do not because 
they do not presuppose an interlocking of the individuals’ personal lives (which is not to deny that individuals 
can have those aggregative attitudes also in same boat scenarios). I now turn to the three main kinds discussed 
by Stavenhagen. 
 
2.1. Cohesive Communities 
 
The socio-psychological term “cohesiveness,” which expresses mutual attraction or liking (see Hogg & 
Abrams 1952: 84), is alien to Stavenhagen. However, the first kind of spiritual communities can be qualified 
as “cohesive” because mutual attraction is pinpointed as the thriving force that brings individuals together in 
these communities. Examples of charismatic communities include friendships, fandoms, romantic 
relationships. As this kind of community has been discussed elsewhere (Salice 2018), a rough outline of 
Stavenhagen’s ideas may suffice for the purposes of this paper. 
 
Suppose Pam comes to know that Sam has a passion for Japanese kaiseki-ryōri cuisine, just as she does. While 
scenarios like this include merely overlapping preferences (Pam happens to have an attitude that is of the same 
 
5 In addition to mass, society, and community, Scheler discusses the total person (Gesamtperson) as a further 
kind of group. It is controversial whether the total person identify a fourth, distinct, kind of group or a sub-
kind of community, see Salice 2016. 
 
 Page 8 of 16 
type of Sam’s and is directed to the same object), Stavenhagen maintains that these summative scenarios can 
easily turn into communal aggregations: imagine further that, after Pam comes to know of Sam’s liking of 
kaiseki-ryōri, she forms the expectation that Sam also likes Japanese literature (as she does). If this expectation 
is frustrated, the distributive or summative scenario remains what it is—a matter of contingency. But if it is 
fulfilled, it may motivate a further expectation, say, the expectation that Pam likes travelling and exploring 
Japan (as Sam does). If this and subsequent expectations, too, are confirmed, Pam may not only begin to frame 
her’s and Pam’s experience to be theirs, she will also start to direct her preferences to Sam: she will start to 
like her. But why does having a preference matching the preference of somebody else sustains the expectation 
of further preferences’ overlap? And why does preferences’ overlap lead to experiential sharing and, 
eventually, to mutual liking? 
 
Stavenhagen considers preferences (liking or disliking) to be motivated by long-standing concerns 
(Grundhaltungen) that shape our mental life. These fundamental concerns do not have a single intentional 
target, but rather delimit a whole domain of objects (in the broadest sense of the term “object”), which the 
subject considers valuable in a certain respect. For instance, Pam’s passion for kaiseki-ryōri is motivated by, 
say, her long-enduring concern for elegance over opulence or for simplicity over baroque-ness. These concerns 
usually shape one’s life by selecting one’s whole range of single preferences. Now, when Pam becomes aware 
of Sam’s preference, she takes this to be indicative of Sam’s long-standing concern, a long-standing concern 
which may delimit the same domain of objects that she, too, considers to be valuable. That is why, according 
to Stavenhagen, Pam will expect that she and Sam entertain further overlapping preferences. Furthermore, if 
several expectations are satisfied, that delivers confirmation to Pam that her domain of valuable objects does 
indeed coincide with Sam’s: they inhabit the same world of valuable objects because they share the very same 
concern. They, together, face and value the world in the same way and from the very same perspective. This 
sameness of perspective elicits a self-understanding as group member and, correlatively, a sense of us. This 
has two important consequences.  
 
On the one hand, us-ness transforms the phenomenality of Pam’s and Sam’s experiences: since they have 
acquired an understanding of themselves as group members, this enables them to live through their preferences 
as theirs, collectively. On the other, depending on the extent to which the two domains mesh, the individuals 
become naturally pre-disposed to like each other: by realising that one appreciates the world in the same way 
as somebody else does, one also, by the same token, includes the other in one’s domain of valuable objects, 
whereby one starts to like the other person (and vice versa). So, “mediate cohesive communities” (communities 
that gravitate around those objects in the world to which the members accord their preferences) tend to evolve 
into “immediate cohesive communities” (communities where the attitudes of the individuals—in addition to 
be directed to the world—also target the other community member). They tend to evolve in this way because 
mediate communities, in a sense, already are (a watered-down form of) immediate communities. The raison 
d’être of these two communities is identical: this is the same evaluative concern for the world, which has 
mutual attraction as its psychological counterpart. 
 
2.2. Communities of Respect  
 
Preferences, in virtue of their very nature, contribute to the formation of communities of a specific kind. The 
same can be said about respect (Achtung): this attitude has the power to aggregate individuals in a communal 
sense (Stavenhagen 1931). Therefore, an understanding of how communities emerge out of respect must 
presuppose a clarification of the very notion of respect Stavenhagen operates with. To do so, I first identify 
the specific intentional object of respect, I then move on to discuss the self-understanding of the respecting 
person, and finally I focus on the aggregative force of respect. 
 
Respect is introduced as a member of a family of recognition attitudes, which includes trust, reliance, and 
admiration in the sense of “being impressed by somebody” (imponieren, Stavenhagen 1931: 14f). An 
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analogical proportion holds among these four concepts: respect is to trust what admiration is to reliance. The 
proportion is based on the ideas that reliance and admiration are directed to the other as a creature with certain 
psychological traits, whereas trust and respect are characterised as moral attitudes in the sense that they target 
the other as a moral person. Reliance and trust include a reference to the action of another person, to which the 
person targeted by the attitude is supposed to contribute (directly or indirectly). Respect and admiration are 
free of such reference. 
 
Focusing on respect, what is the particular aspect under which the moral person is respected? Being a moral 
person, Stavenhagen claims, goes together with having certain moral rights and obligations. However, respect 
is not due to a person merely because of her rights or obligations. For one can have rights and obligations while 
ignoring their existence and, therefore, without acting on them, whereas respect tracks a particular aspect of 
moral agency.6 Especially when it comes to obligations, one can be aware of having an obligation, but without 
feeling committed (sich-verpflichtet-fühlen, Stavenhagen 1931: 10) to act on that obligation. By contrast, if 
you feel committed, you take seriously—or you feel responsible for—the obligation that accrues to you:7 this 
amounts to adopting a certain moral stance towards the world which can be expressed as follows: “there is a 
world, which demands certain courses of conduct” (1931: 20). 
 
The moral person, insofar as she adopts this particular stance, is the target of what Stavenhagen calls 
“dispositional” respect (in contradistinction to “occurrent” respect, see below).8 Dispositional respect involves 
an image (Bild, 1931: 19) of how this person faces the world of obligations: while the person is the focal target 
of attitude, the image is its non-thematic or peripheral object (Stavenhagen 1931: 22). Importantly, this image 
may be frustrated by the actions and attitudes of the (dispositionally) respected person, in which case respect 
may dissolve. For instance, Pam dispositionally respects Sam because of (what appears to her to be) a 
responsible attitude towards her obligations. However, at a closer inspection, Pam notices that, in certain cases, 
the motivational force of Sam’s sense of commitment is blocked by countervailing instances like fear or self-
interest, in which case Sam omits to act on her obligation. Or Pam notices that Sam does act on her obligation, 
yet her action is not motivated by her sense of commitment, but, say, by fear or self-interest. In all these 
circumstances, Pam’s respect in Sam may not only fade, but even be replaced by the polar opposite attitude of 
respect: contempt (Verachtung).9 By contrast, if the sense of commitment motivates one to act on the 
 
6 In making this restriction, Stavenhagen distances himself from the Kantian conception of recognition respect 
as an attitude owed to all persons in virtue of their dignity (Darwall 2013) and by distinguishing respect from 
admiration, he also signals that his notion of respect does not coincide with what is also sometimes called 
“appraisal respect” (Darwall 2006).  
7 Importantly, feeling a sense of commitment may or may not be warranted: it is warranted, if the obligation it 
is about exists, otherwise it is unwarranted. The distinction between sense of commitment and obligation is 
originally drawn by Reinach 2002 and recurs in contemporary discussions in cognitive sciences (Michael et 
al. 2016) and moral psychology (Tomasello 2019).  
8 As mentioned, the moral person can also be made target of another attitude: moral trust (sittliches Vertrauen). 
To be viewed as trustworthy is to be viewed as a person who considers as her obligation to contribute to 
somebody else’s (i.e. the trustor’s) endeavor. Trust is not reliance, because reliance responds to psychological, 
not moral, features of the self. That is why, given the psychological character of an individual, one can rely on 
her to contribute to one’s endeavor, although one may not trust her to do so. A similar consideration applies to 
admiration: a particular action may reveal the audacious character of its agent, which impresses us. However, 
this form of admiration does not correspond to respect because it doesn’t track moral features of the person. 
9 But how far can warranted contempt go? This question should be answered in the context of 
phenomenological axiology. Stavenhagen embraces the widespread idea of a mind-independent hierarchy of 
values (Scheler 1973), which includes vital and spiritual values in their rich taxonomy of values. These are 
values that are exemplified by human beings qua living beings and qua persons. So, even though it is legitimate 
to feel contempt for some individuals (in light of their disregard of obligations), Stavenhagen would contend 
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obligation, then the image is confirmed and dispositional respect turns into (or is corroborated by) actual 
respect. In this case, while the attitude of respect retains the image of the person as its peripheral object, its 
intentional object shifts—this not the moral person, but his or her actions. 
 
At this stage one might wonder where the image of respect originates from. Stavenhagen contends that, to form 
this image, the subject must already be acquainted with the obligations grounded in the moral world (1931: 
22). To put this differently, the subject can form the image of how another person stands towards those 
obligations because she already has an understanding of those obligations. Now, of course, the obligations of 
the other are not the subject’s obligations. Yet, the subject, in respecting the other, consciously acknowledges 
the existence of those obligations that accrue to him or her while understanding that, if she was to find herself 
in the same situation of the other person, she would face—and, importantly, take seriously or be responsible 
for—the very same obligations. 
 
If that is on the right track, one can draw the following interim conclusion. When respecting somebody, the 
subject is pre-reflectively given to herself as a moral person—as somebody who recognises obligations and is 
thereby disposed to have those obligations determining her course of actions.10 But then, the image that, in 
respect, the subject forms of the other, concomitantly indicates an image of the subject herself and of how she 
sees the world and the obligations that are grounded in the world. All this amount to saying that, in respect, 
one finds oneself and the other sharing the same world of obligations: “respect is to reconcile oneself together 
with another to a common moral life facing the world in its entirety” (Stavenhagen 1931: 23).  
 
Just as in the case of cohesive communities, where sharing the same evaluative perspective towards the world 
prompts unification, so here is sharing the same moral perspective a trigger for unification. Respect establishes 
a common moral life of an “unilateral” (Stavenhagen qualifies it as “indirect”) nature: it is unilateral because, 
in principle, this life can unfold without the respected person reciprocating the attitude. However, this only is 
an intermediate step towards the formation of a fully-fledged community of respect, which is not any longer 
unilateral, but reciprocal. 
 
The next step presupposes the idea that certain social acts require that their addressees respond to their 
addressors with acts of a specific kind. For instance, Scheler (in line with Reinach 2002 and von Hildebrand 
1930) writes: “[r]eciprocity [Gegenseitigkeit] as well as equipollence [Gegenwertigkeit] [between certain 
social acts] is absolutely not based on the contingent reality of these acts, on specific persons who execute 
these acts, or on the presence of real mechanisms and factual forms of conveyance in which this reciprocity 
gains reality. It rests on the ideal unity of sense of these acts as acts of the essence of love, respect, promising, 
giving orders, etc., acts that require as ideal correlates responses of mutual love, mutual respect, accepting, 
obeying, etc., in order to form a fact of an unitary sense.” (Scheler 1973: 535f, trans. mod., my italics.). For 
instance, it lies in the essence of an act of questioning to be met by an act of answering and the absence of such 
an answer—failing a plausible explanation on the addressee’s end—will cause an “interruption of sense 
[Sinnunterbrechung]” (Stavenhagen 1931: 34).  
 
Scheler suggests that respect asks for mutual respect, but he does not elaborate further on his intuition. 
Stavenhagen does. It is precisely because, in respect, one appreciates the moral stance adopted by the other in 
 
that their spiritual and vital values still demand to be appreciated as such. This means that warranted contempt 
is directed only towards a person’s specific traits, but not towards the whole person as such. (If it were directed 
towards the whole person, it would be unwarranted precisely because it would disregard this person’s positive 
values.) 
10 Analogously, Stavenhagen argues, the subject is pre-reflectively aware of her lived-body (Leib) and of the 
relations it enters with the environment, which will determine her behaviour (typically in a non-reflective way), 
Stavenhagen 1931: 22. 
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facing his or her obligations that the other, too, is under rational pressure to respect the subject. The other 
should appreciate that the subject recognizes the existence of the obligations she is facing and is also prepared 
to act on them, if these accrued to the subject. 
 
Not always is respect met with reciprocal respect (a case which will cause dismay in the respecting person). 
But if this happens, then a “mutual” (or “direct”) community of respect comes into existence. Stavenhagen 
writes: “In line with the essence of respect, the ‘subject’ and the ‘object’ find themselves as determined to the 
ideally same affective and agentive conduct by the same ethical world. [...] An aidesmatic community of two 
persons is […] fully constituted, when the two communal companions are given to themselves as living in 
conformity to the same ethical personal image [als einem gemeinsamen sittlichen Personbild nachlebend]” 
(1931, 35). Once a community comes to life on the ground of mutual respect between two persons, its life can 
be enriched in two ways.  
 
The first occurs when two subjects happen to face one and the same obligation. If the individuals have already 
formed a community of respect, then this impacts their experiential life and, more specifically, the sense of 
commitment they elicit towards the obligation. Because the two individuals conceive of themselves as group 
members, their two numerically different episodes of sense of commitment are now experienced as one or as 
theirs, collectively. Not any longer: I face an obligation, which happens to be the same obligation that you 
face, but rather: we now face one and the same obligation. 
 
The second is that dyadic communities of respect can grow into communities with n>2 members. Suppose that 
Pam respects Sam. In this case, Pam faces one and the same moral world together with Sam. Now imagine 
that Sam respects Kim. The same can be said about the relation between Sam and Kim: they, too, face the 
same moral world. And if Pam comes to know about Sam’s respect for Kim, Pam will respect Kim as well, 
even though, perhaps, she never met Kim and never will. Respect for Kim is rationally demanded of Pam: 
since she shares the same moral world with Sam and so does Sam with Kim, she should also share it with Kim 
(and if Kim does not act upon her obligations as it is expected of her, then Pam and Sam will experience 
disappointment). Furthermore, since Pam respects her, so is Kim under a rational requirement to reciprocate 
that attitude and, thus, to respect Pam. 
 
Although the main examples of communities of respect discussed by Stavenhagen are medieval and early 
modern groups like estates of the realm (Standesgemeinschaften) or guilds, his description can be extended to 
other groups as well. Central to communities of respect is the notion of honour: to being worthy of respect is 
to have honour. Some features that are attached to honour are the following (Stavenhagen 1931: 43ff). Only 
honourable persons can be members of communities of respect. Honourable persons can be judged only by 
other honourable persons. Not reacting to (esp. offensive) behaviour of an honourable person is (itself) 
offensive. Although it would exceed the purposes of this paper to further explore this conjecture, it may be 
suggested that “learned societies” like scholarly societies or academic associations (but also less commendable 
groups like criminal gangs), insofar as they are regulated by (explicit or implicit) codes of honour, display 
similar features and could thus be described as communities of respect.  
 
2.3 (Cultural) Nations 
 
Cohesive communities and communities of respect require, at least at their earliest stages of formation, face-
to-face encounters among their members for the machinery of community building to be set in motion. This 
presents a limitation and a problem for any taxonomy of kinds of communities. The limitation is that human 
beings often are members of communities with individuals they will never encounter in their life (Stavenhagen 
1934: 48f)—consider the existence of the Japanese nation: it would be obviously presumptuous to stipulate 
that the existence of that group depends on face-to-face encounters between its members. However, equally 
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presumptuous would be to deny the existence of such large-scale communities. But then the problem that arises 
is to identify the mechanisms that are responsible for the emergence of communities of this kind.  
 
Large parts of Stavenhagen’s 1934 monograph on the essence of nation are devoted to the dismissal of various 
attempts at defining the notion of a (cultural) nation based on objective features. Objective conditions are 
neither necessary nor sufficient for the existence of a nation. They are not sufficient because individuals with 
different biological features, but also, say, with different passports may nevertheless constitute a nation. They 
are not sufficient because individuals with the same biological features and/or with the same institutional 
memberships may nevertheless not constitute a nation. The main reason why neither biological nor institutional 
features are relevant to nationality is that national communities are spiritual communities: they require, for 
their existence, that their members have appropriate mental attitudes. But then, what are the attitudes that 
determine memberships to a nation? 
 
The discussion of the previous subsections suggests that being a member of a spiritual community is a matter 
of adopting the same perspective from which the world is confronted and evaluated. In cohesive communities 
and in communities of respect, this common perspective is, in a sense, discovered by the individuals. That very 
discovery brings the community about by transforming the self-understanding of the individuals. By contrast, 
when it comes to nations, individuals grow into a community of this kind by inheriting their communal 
perspective towards the world. Discovering that fact does not bring about the community, it just makes 
transparent their group memberships to its very members. However, how do individuals inherit that communal 
perspective? 
 
To answer this question, Stavenhagen again invokes Husserl’s theory of intentionality and, in particular, the 
idea that intentional acts require meanings to be directed towards objects and facts (Husserl 1984). How exactly 
the notion of meaning should be spelled out phenomenologically remains a matter of debate, but Stavenhagen 
does not discuss that problem (and neither do I in this paper). What is more significant for the issue at stake is 
that, according to Stavenhagen, meanings do not only fulfil a denotative function. More precisely, meanings 
typically also have evaluative content. Terms of natural language usually convey “thick” concepts, which 
“express a union of fact and value” (Williams 2006: 129). And the evaluative component of a thick concept is 
generally fixed by the linguistic community the speaker belongs to (Stavenhagen 1934: 54ff). From this one 
can infer that growing in a linguistic community goes together with inheriting the system of values that is 
inherent in that community. Yet, this is not the only (or the most important) consequence to be drawn. The 
salience that language assigns to certain values is first and foremost relevant to the individual’s affective life. 
Stavenhagen here operates within the framework of the phenomenological theory of emotion, according to 
which emotions respond to evaluative properties that facts and objects exemplify (Scheler 1973, von 
Hildebrand 1916, Mulligan 2010).  
 
The established link between values, emotions, and group memberships allows Stavenhagen to construe the 
notion of “emotional tradition” (Gefühlstradition, 1934: 49, 75), which puts the sensitivity towards values 
fostered by a certain community in a relation with the individuals’ emotional reactions that respond to those 
values. In passing, that link also shows that, contrary to what one might be inclined to think, nations do not 
necessarily presuppose linguistic communities (although they usually do): what matters is that the acquired 
sensitivity towards values generates an emotional tradition. The ways in which this sensitivity is acquired are 
manifold and language is one important—but also only one—way of acquiring it (Stavenhagen 1934: 81).11  
 
 
11 To put this differently, it is possible to imagine paradigmatic scenarios—these are scenarios where 
individuals learn how to elicit appropriate emotive responses (de Sousa 1990)—that do not involve language. 
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If being part of an emotional tradition is to evaluate the world the way a community (one’s community) does, 
then individuals, who emote according to an emotional tradition, de facto are members of a nation.12 Yet, it is 
important to notice that such de facto form of group memberships does not have to be accompanied by a self-
understanding as group member on their members’ ends. In other words, the experiences (especially the 
emotions) that members live through because they are members of a community could still be entertained from 
the members’ first personal perspective, i.e., without exemplifying us-ness. This is conducive to a form of self-
deception for, in situations like this, an individual’s experiential life remains partly opaque to her. This invites 
the question as to how an individual can steer clear of that opaqueness.  
 
Stavenhagen argues that, for an individual to discover her memberships to a cultural nation, is for this 
individual to acquire a we-idea (Wir-Idee). A we-idea (sometimes also called “a community’s self-
consciousness”) is a more or less vague representation that the community has of itself, which is described as 
such: “[t]his self-consciousness [...] is the public opinion that the community traditionally has of its own 
essence. The self-consciousness of a community, e.g., contains indications on the kind of unity [Einssein] of 
the community members, on its foundation, and on that as which ‘we’ are one” (Stavenhagen 1934: 26). And 
further: “[i]nsofar as the we-idea objectifies the communality [Gemeinsamkeit] given in one’s feelings and, as 
it were, grasped in one’s grip, it now cannot any longer be overlooked or evaporate” (Stavenhagen 1934: 44). 
So, the we-idea “entifies” the community (Tuomela 2007: 20) by providing indication to individuals as to what 
unifies them and makes them members of that community. And, in so doing, the we-idea contributes to dissolve 
the opaqueness that characterises the members’ experiential life as it enables them to realize that some of their 
lived-through experiences have its origin in their group membership.  
 
It merits attention that acquiring a we-idea is not merely to acquire a doxastic (or “theoretical”) representation 
(a point which is often signalled by the expression “existential we-idea,” Stavenhagen 1934: 25f, 61). On the 
one hand, a we-idea, by colouring our experience with us-ness, immediately shapes our conduct or behaviour, 
e.g., by eliciting pro-social behaviour: “a traditional circle [Traditionskreis] becomes a community if the 
theoretically conscious communality [theoretisch bewußte Gemeinsamkeit] of the emotional life, which relies 
on an invisible tradition and is experienced as ‘naturally,’ becomes an existential communality [existentielle 
Gemeinsamkeit], that is, […] if the individuals subject to a tradition become conscious of the way in which 
they, in a traditional and solidary way, love and hate, respect and despise, rejoice and suffer etc.” (Stavenhagen 
1934: 59f). On the other, even though we-ideas can be assessed with respect to their truth or falsity, what 
mainly matters from the perspective of social phenomenology is whether they are endorsed or not. For 
instance, the we-idea that membership to a particular nation depends on biological features is patently false 
because, as seen, nations are spiritual communities, and yet this is not preclusive for it to operate at the 
communal level. If endorsed, that we-idea will shape the members’ self-understanding and, by extension, the 
nation itself. 
 
This brings Stavenhagen’s discussion on the verge of political philosophy: for a we-idea is at the basis of the 
institutional organization that a nation gives to itself. This is why Stavenhagen considers cultural nations to 
ground state nations (Stavenhagen 1934: 98ff). It exceeds the purposes of this paper to explore Stavenhagen’s 
political philosophy, but it may be relevant to conclude this section by developing some brief considerations 
on this issue. On the one hand, Stavenhagen’s social philosophy is consistent with, and actually conducive to, 
a conservative form of communitarianism (as this was defended, e.g., by two of his main philosophical 
references: Scheler and von Hildebrand). On the other, the main aim of Stavenhagen’s social phenomenology 
(as this has been reconstructed in this paper) is to fulfil descriptive desiderata and, in particular, to answer 
questions related to the psychological pre-conditions of our social identity. Therefore, it could be claimed that 
Stavenhagen’s answers to those descriptive questions do not straightforwardly translate into a political 
 
12 These evaluations inform a group ethos (Sitten): these are actions community members find (un-)appropriate 
to do or to omit in given circumstances (Stavenhagen 1934: 82f). 
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The main purpose of this article was to introduce Stavenhagen’s social phenomenology by emphasising its 
original aspects against the backdrop of the debate on we-intentionality in classical phenomenology. These 
have been identified in his particularly detailed description of we-experiences and, perhaps more importantly, 
in the diversified account of kinds of communities that he developed. Stavenhagen should be credited with the 
merit of having unearthed the aggregative, we-generating force of preferences, of respect, and of emotions. 
However, these ideas constitute only a limited set of his contributions and also one that this paper could expose 
only to the level of detail adequate to its main purpose. 
 
There are at least two ways in which his thought could be made subject of further investigations, the pursuit 
of which will be a task for future research. First, his positions in social phenomenology are closely connected 
with other strands of his research. To fully appreciate Stavenhagen’s positions, it would be important to 
understand how it relates to his—and his fellow phenomenologists’—descriptive psychology, axiology, and 
to the theory of (especially: social) action. Second, the resonances between Stavenhagen’s social 
phenomenology and certain positions currently debated in social philosophy will appear as particularly striking 
to everybody familiar with contemporary discussions, to mention but few: Gilbert’s theory of joint 
commitments (2014), Helm’s view about communities of respect (2017), or Zahavi’s investigations into social 
identity (2014b). How Stavenhagen can contribute to these debates is a page of phenomenology that still has 
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